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O 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     
  n September 19, 2015, the Upper House of the Japanese Diet passed 
two security bills introduced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe amid fierce de-
bate that divided the nation over their constitutionality.1 This was the sec-
ond time controversial security-related legislation had been enacted under 
the Abe administration. It followed enactment of the State Secret Protec-
tion Law in December 2013, again at a time public opinion was deeply di-
vided.2 In accordance with the “proactive contribution to peace” policy 
adopted by the Abe administration, the 2015 security legislation is designed 
to enable a “seamless response” to any security situation that may arise in 
order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals and 
to make a more proactive contribution to international peace and security.3       
In Japan, the enactment of security-related legislation always faces con-
troversy. The public debate over the most recent bills was further fueled by 
the decision made by Prime Minister Abe in 2014 to, in effect, reinterpret 
Article 9—the famous “war renunciation” clause4—of the Japanese Consti-
tution, a reinterpretation that allows Japan to act in collective self-defense 
                                                                                                                      
1. Cabinet Bill No. 72 of 189th Diet Session (May 15, 2015); Cabinet Bill No. 73 of 
189th Diet Session (May 15, 2015). For the public debate, see, e.g., Satoru Mori, The New 
Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction, THE TOKYO FOUNDATION (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-legislation-and-public-reac 
tion; Peter Drysdale, The Trouble with Japan’s New Security Bills, EAST ASIA FORUM (Aug. 3, 
2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/03/the-trouble-with-japans-new-security-
bills/; Ben Ascione, Storm Brews over Japan’s New Security Laws, EAST ASIA FORUM (Aug. 2, 
2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/02/storm-brews-over-japans-new-security 
-laws/. 
2. Act on the Protection of Specified Secrets, Law No. 108 of 2013. For the public 
debate, see, e.g., Justin McDonnell, Japan’s State Secrets Bill Polarizes Society, THE DIPLOMAT 
(Nov. 28, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/japans-state-secrets-bill-polarizes-
society/; Editorial, Anti-Democratic Secrecy Bill, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013), http:// 
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/09/09/editorials/anti-democratic-secrecy-bill/. 
3. Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Ja-
pan’s Survival and Protect its People (Provisional Translation), July 1, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html [hereinafter Cabinet Decision]. 
4. CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, art. 9 (“(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state 
will not be recognized.”).   
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
 
251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of key allies, such as the United States and Australia.5 This reinterpretation 
was controversial because the exercise of the right of collective self-defense 
has traditionally been considered prohibited by Article 9,6 notwithstanding 
the centrality of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security be-
tween Japan and the United States7 to Japan’s security policy. While there is 
no express reference to the right of collective self-defense in the 2015 legis-
lation, the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for mili-
tary action when Japan itself is not subject to an armed attack was debated 
as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense during the enactment of 
this legislation.  
The interpretation of Article 9 has been the subject of scholarly debate 
for many years;8 however, its interpretation by reference to relevant rules of 
                                                                                                                      
5. See, e.g., William Blum, Shinzo Abe’s “Reinterpretation” of the Japanese Constitution, FOR-
EIGN POLICY JOURNAL (July 15, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/ 
07/15/shinzo-abes-reinterpretation-of-the-japanese-constitution/; David Letts & Hitoshi 
Nasu, Japanese Constitutional Re-Interpretation: Much Ado about Nothing?, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (July 4, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/comment/japanese-constitutional-rein 
terpretation-much-ado-about-nothing-20140704-zsw7j.html. 
6. Naikaku Hosei Kyoku, Shuudanteki-Jieiken to Kenpou no Kankei ni tsuite [Cabi-
net Legislation Bureau, On the Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense 
and the Constitution] (Oct. 14, 1972). This was a document submitted to the Budget 
Committee of the House of Councillors. 
7. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of 
America, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632. 
8. For English language literature, see, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 233–48 (2010); Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: 
Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus ad Bellum, 30 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2008); John O. Haley, Waging War: Japan’s Constitutional 
Constraints, 14 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM, no. 2, 2005, at 18; Mark A. Chinen, Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Japan and the Use of Procedural and Substantive Heuristics for Consensus, 27 MICHI-
GAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (2005); Hideo Nagano, The Meaning of Article 9 
of the Japanese Constitution, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 
239 (Kenneth L. Port & Gerald Paul McAlinn eds., 2d ed. 2003); Matthew J. Gilley, Japan’s 
Developing Military Potential within the Context of its Constitutional Renunciation, 14 EMORY IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 1681 (2000); Shotaro Hamura & Eric Shiu, Renunciation of 
War as a Universal Principle of Mankind—A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution, 
44 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 426 (1995); Sandra Madsen, 
The Japanese Constitution and Self-Defense Forces: Prospects for a New Japanese Military Role, 3 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 549 (1993); James E. Auer, Arti-
cle Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force “Forever” to the Third Largest 
Defense Budget in the World, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 171 (1990); OSAMU 
NISHI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
(1987). 
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international law rarely commands attention, even though the provisions of 
Article 98(2) of the Constitution refer to “faithfully observing”9 treaties and 
international law.10 Typifying this lack of attention, the Cabinet’s constitu-
tional argument is based on a contextual interpretation by reference to the 
right to live in peace recognized in the preamble and the right to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness in Article 13, rather than to the right of self-
defense under international law.11    
Because of this controversy Japan has traditionally adopted a twisted 
meaning of the term “use of force” for the purpose of interpreting Article 
9 to enable a limited degree of SDF activities. That is, the use of force sub-
ject to the Article 9 restrictions—in other words, being prohibited except 
for national self-defense and law enforcement—involves any deployment 
of SDF troops authorized to use weapons in combat situations. Converse-
ly, support activities outside combat areas have been deemed not to consti-
tute the “use of force” and therefore not restricted. This artificial distinc-
tion between different types of SDF activities is contrary to the general un-
derstanding of the term use of force under international law,12 which en-
compasses the use of armed force in all forms whether it is directly or indi-
rectly employed.13 
The fixation with the constitutionality of use of force issues in the Jap-
anese public debate calls into question whether, and to what extent, the 
international law issues that might arise with the implementation of the 
                                                                                                                      
9. The full text provides, “The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of na-
tions shall be faithfully observed.”  
10. For an attempt by the author a decade ago to examine the constitutionality of the 
use of force in the exercise of the right of self-defense under international law, see Hitoshi 
Nasu, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution: Revisited in the Light of International Law, 18 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR JAPANISCHES RECHT [JOURNAL OF JAPANESE LAW] 50 (2004). 
11. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, § 3(2). 
12. Akira Mayama, Kenpo-teki Yousei ni yoru Shudan-Jieiken Genteiteki-Koushi no Hatsugen 
Keitai: Gaikoku Ryosui Soukai oyobi Gaikokugun Kouhou Shien [The Manifestation of a Limited 
Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-Defense under the Constitutional Requirement: Minesweeping in 
the Territorial Sea of a Foreign State and Rear Support for Foreign Troops], 648 KOKUSAI MONDAI 
[INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS] 16, 18–24 (2016). 
13. See, e.g., Oliver Dörr and Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 210-213 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2012). In order to avoid confusion, for the purposes of this article the term “use of force” 
under international law is referred to as the “use of armed force,” whereas the term “use 
of force”—or “use of weapons” as it appears in the relevant legislation—is used in the 
Japanese domestic law context. The term “use of physical force” is used to refer to other 
types of use of force such as the use of force by peacekeepers. 
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new security legislation have been scrutinized. This article examines how 
the SDF can respond with the use of force to contemporary security 
threats within the new legislative framework, while also complying with the 
relevant rules of international law. After briefly reviewing the historical 
background leading to the adoption of the new security legislation and its 
contents (Section II), it examines three different situations in which the 
SDF may find itself operating: “gray-zone” situations (Section III); peace-
keeping operations with a mandate to protect civilians (Section IV); and 
collective self-defense (Section V). 
 
II. JAPAN’S 2015 SECURITY LEGISLATION 
 
The new security legislation package, which was enacted on September 30, 
2015, consists of (1) the Law for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense 
Forces Law and other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of 
Japan and the International Community (Security Laws Amendment Law)14 
and (2) the Law Concerning Japan’s Cooperation and Support Activities 
for Foreign Military Forces and other Personnel in Situations that the In-
ternational Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security 
(International Peace Support Law).15 The latter removed temporal and geo-
graphical restrictions previously imposed upon various peace support oper-
ations undertaken by the SDF overseas.16 
The Security Laws Amendment Law is a collection of partial amend-
ments to the following ten laws:17 
 
                                                                                                                      
14. Law No. 76 of 2015, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gi 
an/honbun/houan/g18905072.htm [hereinafter Security Laws Amendment Law]. For an 
English summary, see JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2015 ref. 6 
(2015), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_reference_web.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER]. 
15. Law No. 77 of 2015, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian 
/honbun/houan/g18905073.htm [hereinafter International Peace Support Law]. For an 
English summary, see 2015 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, ref. 7. 
16. For example, Law on Special Measures Concerning the Implementation of Hu-
manitarian and Reconstruction Support Activities and Support Activities Ensuring Safety 
in Iraq, Law No. 137 of 2003 (which expired in 2009 having been extended once); Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law, Law No. 113 of 2001 (which expired in 2007 having 
been extended three times).  
17. In addition, technical amendments were made to ten other legislative instruments 
in the Annexes to the Law.  
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 Law Concerning the Self-Defense Forces (SDF Law);18 
 Law Concerning Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping 
and other Operations (PKO Law);19 
 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security in 
Areas Surrounding Japan (renamed as the Law Concerning 
Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that 
Constitute Grave Circumstances Affecting Japan) (Grave Circum-
stances Law);20 
 Law Concerning the Implementation of Ship Inspection Activities 
in Areas Surrounding Japan (renamed as the Law Concerning the 
Implementation of Ship Inspection Activities in Situations that 
Constitute Grave Circumstances Affecting Japan);21 
 Law Concerning the Defense of Japan’s Peace and Independence 
as well as National Security and the Safety of its Nationals in the 
Event of an Armed Attack against Japan (renamed as the Law 
Concerning the Defense of Japan’s Peace and Independence as well 
as National Security and the Safety of its Nationals in the Event of 
an Armed Attack or an Existential Threat to Japan) (Defense 
against an Armed Attack Law);22 
 Law Concerning Measures to be Implemented During Military Ac-
tion by the United States of America in the Event of an Armed At-
tack against Japan (renamed as the Law Concerning Measures to be 
Implemented During Military Action by the United States of Amer-
ica and other States in the Event of an Armed Attack or an Exis-
tential Threat to Japan);23 
                                                                                                                      
18. Law No. 165 of 1954 [hereinafter SDF Law]. 
19. Law No. 79 of 1992 [hereinafter PKO Law]. 
20. Law No. 60 of 1999 [hereinafter Grave Circumstances Law]. The English transla-
tion in the 2015 Defense White Paper is the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace 
and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s 
Peace and Security. 2015 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 318–19. 
21. Law No. 45 of 2000. 
22. Law No. 79 of 2003. The English translation in the 2015 Defense White Paper is 
the Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the 
People in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs and in Situa-
tions of an Armed Attack against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan’s Sur-
vival. 2015 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 319. 
23. Law No. 113 of 2004. 
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 Law Concerning the Use of Designated Public and other Facilities 
in the Event of an Armed Attack against Japan;24 
 Law Concerning the Regulation of the Marine Transport of For-
eign Military Equipment and other Supplies in the Event of an 
Armed Attack against Japan (renamed as the Law Concerning the 
Regulation of the Marine Transport of Foreign Military and other 
Supplies in the Event of an Armed Attack or an Existential Threat 
to Japan);25 
 Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Per-
sonnel in the Event of an Armed Attack against Japan (renamed as 
the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other 
Personnel in the Event of an Armed Attack or an Existential 
Threat to Japan);26 and 
 Law Concerning the Establishment of the National Security Coun-
cil.27  
  
The numerous changes in the 2015 legislation overhauled Japan’s secu-
rity law regime that had developed as a patchwork of technical amend-
ments and special legislation,28 addressing various strategic considerations 
that emerged over the last decade within the government and the security 
experts’ community in response to Japan’s changing security environ-
ment.29 The Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for 
Security, established in 2007 by Prime Minister Abe during his first term, 
was instructed to explore legal bases for the protection of U.S. Navy ves-
sels on the high seas, the interception of a ballistic missile possibly directed 
at the United States, the use of force in international peacekeeping opera-
tions and logistical support for foreign forces participating in peacekeeping 
                                                                                                                      
24. Law No. 114 of 2004. 
25. Law No. 116 of 2004. 
26. Law No. 117 of 2004. 
27. Law No. 71 of 1986. 
28. For the history of legislative changes, see GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTRE, 
THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CON-
STITUTION (Sept. 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/japan-interpre 
tations-article-9.pdf. 
29. The shifts in Japan’s security policy have been explained in a variety of ways. See, 
e.g., CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES, JAPAN’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY UNDER THE 
“ABE DOCTRINE”: NEW DYNAMISM OR NEW DEAD END? (2015); BHUBHINDAR SINGH, 
JAPAN’S SECURITY IDENTITY: FROM A PEACE STATE TO AN INTERNATIONAL STATE 
(2013). 
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operations or other activities. The Advisory Panel’s report was submitted 
to Prime Minister Fukuda in 2008,30 recommending an interpretation of 
Article 9 of the Constitution that would permit the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense and a more proactive engagement in United Nations 
collective security actions;31 however, no serious discussion took place 
within the government at that time and no action was taken on the report’s 
recommendations. 
The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, es-
tablished under the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) when it 
came to power in September 2009, conducted a review of Japan’s security 
and defense policy in which it too addressed such issues as ballistic and 
cruise missile strikes and participation in international peace support opera-
tions.32 However, in contrast to the 2008 report, the Council’s report em-
phasized the need to formulate defense capabilities in order to be able to 
“respond seamlessly” to developments in a “gray-zone” situation—a situa-
tion that lies “between peacetime and wartime.”33 It also advocated that 
Japan embrace a more proactive defense posture, observing that the tradi-
tional position that Japan could not exercise its right of collective self-
defense under Article 9 of the Constitution “can be changed if Japan 
chooses to do so.”34 The revised National Defense Program Guidelines for 
FY 2011 and Beyond (2010 National Defense Program Guidelines), an-
nounced on December 17, 2010, focused on buttressing Japan’s ability to 
respond to gray-zone situations.35 This indicated a clear shift in defense 
policy resulting from growing concerns about the increased Chinese mari-
time activities near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and “on water” incidents 
                                                                                                                      
30. ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON THE RECONSTRUCTION 
OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SECURITY (2008), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhos 
you2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf. 
31. Id. at 22–31.  
32. COUNCIL ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN THE NEW ERA, JAPAN’S 
VISIONS FOR FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN THE NEW ERA: TO-
WARD A PEACE-CREATING NATION 25–34, (2010), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ 
shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf. 
33. Id. at 5, 36, 56. 
34. Id. at 13. 
35. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR FY 
2011 AND BEYOND 3–4, 6–7 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.tr.emb-japan.go.jp/T_06/ 
files/National_Defense_Program_FY2011.PDF [hereinafter 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE 
PROGRAM GUIDELINES]. 
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that resulted from the Chinese actions.36 It was also an attempt by the DPJ 
to achieve greater independence from the United States, reflecting, in par-
ticular, the controversy over the presence of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma in Okinawa.37  
After Prime Minister Abe took office to lead his second cabinet, the 
Advisory Panel was re-convened in February 2013, and submitted its final 
report on May 15, 2014.38 The panel had been given a broader mandate 
than it had previously: to examine actions Japan should take to maintain its 
peace and security, and to ensure its survival in the new and emerging secu-
rity environment.39 The recommendations in this report provided the bases 
for the cabinet decision made on July 1, 2014, the objective of which was 
to develop a legal framework that would enable Japan to respond seamless-
ly to changing security circumstances in four areas: (1) gray-zone situations, 
(2) logistical support of foreign troops, (3) the use of force in peace sup-
port operations, and (4) the use of force in collective self-defense when 
there is an existential threat to Japan.40  
Each of these areas was subsequently addressed as follows. First, the 
cabinet pledged to address gray-zone situations by improving capabilities 
and coordination between government agencies, carefully examining rele-
vant statutory provisions prior to national security and maritime security 
operations, and developing new legislation that would allow the SDF to 
carry out defensive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent 
necessary to protect U.S. defense assets contributing to the defense of Ja-
pan.41 The 2015 legislation fulfilled this pledge with respect to the protec-
tion of U.S. defense assets,42 but did not directly address gray-zone situa-
tions. Instead, through a series of cabinet decisions, the government estab-
                                                                                                                      
36. David Fouse, Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines: Coping with the “Grey 
Zones,” ASIA-PACIFIC PAPERS (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu), Apr. 
2011, at 6–7, http://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fouse-Japan-Final.pdf. 
37. See William T. Tow & Rikki Kersten, Introduction, in BILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
REGIONAL SECURITY: AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 1, 4–5 (Wil-
liam T. Tow & Rikki Kersten eds., 2012). 
38. ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON RECONSTRUCTION OF 
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SECURITY (2014), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosy 
ou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf ADVISORY PANEL REPORT]. 
39. Id. at 3.  
40. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3. 
41. Id. § 1(4). 
42. SDF Law, supra note 18, art 95(2). 
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lished new communication procedures to expedite decision-making for na-
tional security and maritime security operations.43   
Second, the government adopted a new understanding under which 
support activities would not constitute the use of force unless they were 
conducted in places where combat activities were actually taking place. This 
replaced the previous position that limited the geographical scope where 
the SDF could operate to “rear areas.”44 Based on this understanding, the 
new security legislation enables the SDF to provide logistical support (in-
cluding ship inspections) to forces of other countries engaged in activities 
that contribute to Japan’s peace and security, or to international peace and 
security, with none of the temporal or geographical limitations (such as the 
areas surrounding Japan) of the previous understanding.45 This means that 
the SDF is now allowed to engage in support activities anywhere in the 
world when the situation constitutes grave circumstances affecting Japan’s 
peace and security, for example, when Japan might be subject to an armed 
attack if the situation was left unaddressed,46 or when foreign military forc-
es are operating under UN authorization.47 In both instances, however, the 
prohibition on providing support in an area where combat activities are 
taking place applies.48   
Third, although it was the least controversial aspect of the Advisory 
Panel report, a significantly progressive proposal was put forward to ex-
pand the scope of Japan’s cooperation with UN peacekeeping operations, 
enabling the SDF to use weapons to protect civilians under physical attack 
or for the purpose of executing the peacekeeping mission.49 This proposal 
was incorporated into amendments to the PKO Law as part of the 2015 
legislation, which also extended the types of missions in which the SDF 
                                                                                                                      
43. Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying out Navigation through the Territo-
rial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does not Fall under Innocent Passage in In-
ternational Law (May 14, 2015), 2015 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 14 ref. 8; The 
Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas 
by an Armed Group (May 14, 2015), id., ref. 9; Responses to Acts of Infringement When 
Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts against 
Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas (May 14, 2015), id., ref. 10. 
44. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, § 2(1). 
45. Security Laws Amendment Law, supra note 14, arts. 3, 4. 
46. Grave Circumstances Law, supra note 20, art. 1. 
47. International Peace Support Law, supra note 15, art. 3. 
48. Grave Circumstances Law, supra note 20, art. 2(3); International Peace Support 
Law, supra note 15, art. 2(3). 
49. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, § 2(2). 
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could participate, to include international peace and humanitarian opera-
tions undertaken by other international or regional organizations.50 While 
the use of physical force by peacekeepers beyond their own personal self-
defense (or, according to the Japanese official texts, “self-preservation”) 
was traditionally considered prohibited under Article 9,51 no serious objec-
tion appears to have been raised in the Diet during the legislative process 
or by the public at large. 
Fourth, the government revisited its legal position on the legitimate use 
of force under Article 9 of the Constitution in light of the fact that Japan’s 
security environment had fundamentally changed and was constantly 
evolving as a result of the global power balance shift, rapid technological 
advances and various transnational threats.52 More specifically, the gov-
ernment proposed a revision to one of the three requirements for the legit-
imate use of force, “when an armed attack against Japan occurs,” to include 
situations where an armed attack occurs against a country that has a close 
relationship with Japan and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses 
a clear danger that fundamentally undermines the lives and freedoms of its 
nationals, and their right to pursue happiness (i.e., there is an existential 
threat).53 This expanded authority for the use of force has been incorpo-
rated into the revised SDF Law and the Defense against an Armed Attack 
Law under the new security legislation.54 It is important to note that the 
amendments expand the circumstances in which the legitimate use of force 
can be exercised within the ambit of Article 9, but do not justify them on 
the basis of the right of collective self-defense, although the Cabinet deci-
sion does refer to the right of collective self-defense as a potential legal ba-
sis under international law for actions taken in certain situations.55      
The fundamental philosophy that consistently underlies these security 
policy developments is the belief that Japan’s national security is better as-
sured by creating a stable and predictable international environment and 
preventing the emergence of threats through international cooperation. 
This idea resonates with the doctrine of comprehensive security developed 
under former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, which envisaged 
                                                                                                                      
50. Security Laws Amendment Law, supra note 14, art. 2. 
51. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, § 2(2) para. A; ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, supra 
note 38, at 37–38. 
52. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, § 3. 
53. Id. § 3(3). 
54. Security Laws Amendment Law, supra note 14, arts. 1, 5.  
55. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, §3(4). 
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the balancing of three approaches to national security: (1) self-help, (2) ef-
forts to make the entire international environment more favorable to Ja-
pan’s national security, and (3) coordination with States that share Japan’s 
ideals and interests.56 Prime Minister Abe’s “proactive contribution to 
peace” policy response to the contemporary security environment sur-
rounding Japan can be considered as a logical extension of this approach to 
national security. While the latest round of legislative updates goes some 
way to achieve the overall goal of enhancing Japan’s national security, the 
devil remains in the details as to how the SDF can use the new legislative 
authority as the basis for the legitimate use of force, while still meeting the 
demands of the relevant rules of international law. 
 
III. THE USE OF FORCE IN GRAY-ZONE SITUATIONS 
 
The notion of gray-zone situations officially emerged in Japan with the 
2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, which defined these situations 
as “confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic interests that 
are not to escalate into wars.”57 Although it was the policy product of the 
previous DPJ government, the concept of the gray-zone appears in the 
new guidelines adopted by the Abe cabinet and also in the 2014 Defense 
White Paper, where it is noted that the number of gray-zone situations is 
increasing and where they are redefined as “neither pure peacetime nor 
contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests, 
etc.”58 Defined as such, the concept envisages disputes over territory, sov-
ereignty and economic interests that will give rise to situations that can be 
categorized neither truly as peace nor war. 
As discussed above, the 2015 legislation does not address gray-zone 
situations directly, but does expand the SDF’s role in protecting U.S. de-
                                                                                                                      
56. Sougou Anzenhoshou Kenkyuu Group Houkokusho [Comprehensive Security Study Group 
Report], in OHIRA SOURI NO SEISAKU KENKYUUKAI HOUKOKUSHO [POLICY STUDY 
GROUP REPORTS COMMISSIONED BY PRIME MINISTER OHIRA] 301, 309–13 (1980). For 
an English language commentary on Japan’s comprehensive security policy at that time, 
see J.W.M. CHAPMAN, R. DRIFTE & I.T.M. GOW, JAPAN’S QUEST FOR COMPREHENSIVE 
SECURITY: DEFENSE—DIPLOMACY—DEPENDENCE (1983). 
57. 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 3.  
58. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR FY 
2014 AND BEYOND 1 (2013), http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/ 
2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2014, Overview 
at 2 (2014), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_1-1-0_web_10 
31.pdf . 
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fense assets in certain circumstances, in the absence of an armed attack di-
rected against Japan. These legislative changes therefore mean that the 
gray-zone situations in which the SDF is mandated to operate are broader 
than previously envisaged.59 The introduction of two new concepts—grave 
circumstances affecting Japan and an existential threat to Japan—may 
make available more options under Japan’s domestic law in trying to find a 
way through gray-zone situations. However, these options must be consid-
ered in relation to relevant concepts of international law, namely the au-
thority to use armed force (jus ad bellum) and the rules applicable when a 
situation amounts to an international or non-international armed conflict 
(jus in bello).   
 
A. Jus ad Bellum Issues 
 
Even though the SDF is authorized to use weapons to the minimum extent 
necessary for law enforcement purposes in gray-zone situations, various 
restrictions apply unless the situation amounts to an armed attack or poses 
an existential threat to Japan. The SDF Law authorizes SDF personnel to 
use weapons pursuant to the order of the command when reasonable in 
circumstances where there is an act of violence against, or a clear danger to, 
persons, equipment or facilities and when there is no other appropriate 
means to eliminate the threat. Specifically, weapons may be used to the ex-
tent considered necessary to maintain public order in an emergency situa-
tion,60 to protect defense facilities61 or, under limited circumstances, to un-
dertake maritime police action.62 The SDF can also employ weapons to the 
extent reasonable to protect weapons and other equipment, including, as 
provided for in the new security legislation, U.S. defense assets contrib-
uting to the defense of Japan.63 However, the use of the weapons must not 
result in injury or death unless SDF personnel are acting in self-defense or 
with necessity under Articles 36 and 37 of the Criminal Code.64 The use of 
weapons under these circumstances is considered a matter of law enforce-
                                                                                                                      
59. Koichi Morikawa, Gray Zone Jitai Taisho no Shatei to sono Houteki Seishitsu [The Range 
of the Response to Gray Zone Situations and its Legal Nature], 648 KOKUSAI MONDAI [INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS] 29, 29–30 (2016). 
60. SDF Law, supra note 18, arts. 78, 81(1), 89–91. 
61. Id., arts. 81(2), 91(2). 
62. Id., arts. 82(1), 93(1).  
63. Id., art. 95(1)–(2). 
64. Law No. 45 of 1907. 
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ment under Japanese domestic law and, therefore, is not considered to 
constitute a use of force subject to the restrictions of Article 9 of the Con-
stitution.  
On the other hand, actions that can be taken in national self-defense 
are regulated by the Defense against an Armed Attack Law. It establishes 
requirements that must be met in order for the prime minister to direct de-
ployment of SDF units in the event of an armed attack under Article 76 
with authority to use all necessary force under Article 88.65 
Certainly, however, the authorization for the use of weapons to protect 
U.S. defense assets does appear to go beyond the scope of what would 
normally be considered to be a law enforcement action under international 
law.66 Indeed, Defense Minister Nakatani affirmed that in a gray-zone situa-
tion, the SDF could defend a U.S. Navy vessel engaging in a combined op-
eration from an incoming missile attack with a defensive missile.67 It is thus 
possible that the use of weapons authorized under Japanese domestic law 
could constitute a use of armed force in the sense of Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.68  
The question is whether Japan can justify such an action as an exercise 
of the right of national self-defense under international law. The issue aris-
es because international law sets a relatively high threshold for the use of 
armed force to qualify as an armed attack for the purposes of exercising the 
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) established in its Nicaragua judgment, the right 
of self-defense can only be exercised in response to the “most grave forms 
                                                                                                                      
65. Under Article 88 of the SDF Law, the SDF can use all necessary force in order to 
defend the nation when it is so authorized by Prime Minister in accordance with Article 
76(1) of the SDF Law in the event of an armed attack or an existential threat to Japan. The 
use of armed force, however, must comply with the relevant rules and custom of interna-
tional law and must not exceed what is considered reasonable under the circumstances. 
SDF Law, supra note 18, as amended by Law No. 76 of 2015, supra note 14, arts. 76, 88.  
66. According to the ICJ, “[b]oarding, inspection, arrest and minimum use of force 
for those purposes” fall within the concept of maritime law enforcement. Fisheries Juris-
diction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432, ¶ 84 (Dec. 4). See also Award in the Ar-
bitration Regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guyana and Su-
riname (Guy. v. Surin.), 30 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶¶ 425–45 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007). 
67. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, Remarks before the Special Committee of the 
House of Councillors on the Bills for Peace and Security of Japan and the International 
Community, 189th Diet Sess. Official Record of Proceedings, No. 11, at 5 (Aug. 21, 2015).  
68. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
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of the use of force,” while use of force of a lesser degree of gravity (e.g., 
“mere frontier incidents”) limits the response to the taking of counter-
measures not involving the use of armed force.69 It is important to appreci-
ate this judgment in its context, a dispute concerning armed bands sent by 
one State into the territory of another State, rather than the direct use of 
armed force by a State. Therefore, the judgment leaves room for justifying 
military action as self-defense under international law in a frontier incident 
involving the regular armed forces of another State.70 The gravity standard 
nevertheless remains the law with respect to attacks launched by non-State 
armed groups, although State practice continues to evolve as the nature of 
the threat they pose changes due to technological advances.71 
While the gravity standard is subject to different interpretation by 
States according to their perception of the threat to their national security, 
the deployment of the SDF under Articles 76 and 88 of the SDF Law in 
dealing with gray-zone situations could be problematic. In Japan, while an 
armed attack is interpreted as “an organized, premeditated use of force 
against Japan,”72 its action in national self-defense is subject to the political 
determination of an armed attack in accordance with Article 76 of the SDF 
Law. The official authorization for the deployment of the SDF in national 
self-defense may not be readily available, partly due to the high gravity 
threshold of an armed attack as informed by international law jurispru-
dence, but also due to the political considerations associated with recogniz-
ing the existence of an armed attack directed against Japan, particularly 
when the involvement of a foreign State in the attack is uncertain. The new 
concept of “an existential threat to Japan” could be a useful way to circum-
vent political risks involved in the official recognition of an armed attack 
directed against Japan; however, the concept, as it is currently defined un-
                                                                                                                      
69. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 191, 195, 249 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
70. See especially Judge Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Notion of “Armed Attack” in the Nicara-
gua Judgment and Its Influence on Subsequent Case Law, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL Law 461, 463–70 (2012).  
71. In the cyber context, see, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus ad 
Bellum Revisited, 56 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 569, 583 (2011). 
72. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Shuugiin Giin Kaneda Seiichi-kun Teishutsu 
Buryoku Kougeki Jitai ni kansuru Shitsumonsho ni taisuru Toubensho [Reply to the Ques-
tions Concerning an Armed Attack Submitted by Seiichi Kaneda, a Member of the House 
of Representatives] (May 24, 2003); SHIGENOBU TAMURA, KENICHI TAKAHASHI & 
KAZUHISA SHIMADA, NIHON NO BOUEI-HOUSEI [THE LAW OF DEFENSE IN JAPAN] 17 
(2d ed. 2012). 
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der Japanese domestic law, still requires an armed attack against a foreign 
State in a close relationship with Japan and, in that respect, restricts its po-
tential application as a ground for authorizing the deployment of the SDF 
in a gray-zone situation. 
Accordingly, absent the recognition by the Japanese government of an 
armed attack against Japan or a close ally, any action taken to deal with a 
gray-zone situation is restricted, as far as the Japanese domestic law is con-
cerned, to law enforcement which must comply with stringent regulation of 
the use of weapons. While under international law more forcible and effec-
tive action is justifiable,73 institutionalizing the SDF’s response according to 
the legal classification of situations under Japanese domestic law means 
that limited legal options are available to justify Japan’s action in a gray-
zone situation. This is particularly so where the action involves repelling 
threats to national security in a low intensity conflict that falls below the 
gravity threshold required to exercise the right of self-defense. For exam-
ple, when a large fleet of fishing vessels, coordinated with the assistance of 
unmanned aerial vehicles for communication and intelligence collection, 
enters into a disputed maritime zone, the SDF can only respond by using 
weapons to the extent reasonable under the prevailing situation and under 
defined circumstances within the territorial sea that Japan claims.74 Howev-
er, limiting the SDF’s response to the use of weapons to the extent reason-
able under the prevailing situation may prevent it from taking effective ac-
tion to suppress the incursion, for example, by destroying the unmanned 
aerial vehicles in order to disrupt communication, an action that would 
have been possible under Article 88 of the SDF Law. In other words, the 
strictures of the legislative framework for the use of force in Japan may 
expose its vulnerability to certain types of hostile conduct by external ac-
tors, especially when they engage in covert operations or surprise attacks.75 
                                                                                                                      
73. Admittedly, its precise legal basis remains contentious. See Tom Ruy, The Meaning 
of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN 
Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 177–79 
(2014).  
74. SDF Law, supra note 18, art. 91; Maritime Safety Agency Law No. 28 of 1948 art. 
20(2). Such action will be consistent with the relevant rules of international law: United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 25(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter LOS Convention]; M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, 
Judgment of July 1, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 155. 
75. Koki Sato, Bouei-Houseido ni okeru “Kishuu Taisho no Mondai” no Genjou to Kongo no 
Kentou no Houkousei [The Current Situation Concerning “the Issue of the Response to Surprise At-
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This weakness can be exploited by hostile States and non-State actors ca-
pable of engaging in hybrid warfare.    
Although there is no universally agreed definition of hybrid warfare, 
the term typically envisages a convergence or blending of regular and irreg-
ular warfare into multi-modal hostilities in terms of both their organization 
and the methods of warfare employed.76 It involves a hierarchical com-
mand and control structure coupled with decentralized, networked units, 
combining conventional military capabilities with irregular tactics, cyberat-
tacks, terrorist acts and other criminal activities that facilitate disorder and 
disruption in target State. The strategic rationale for engaging in hybrid 
warfare may vary; however, an important consideration from a legal per-
spective is that hybrid warfare exploits legal gaps that exist within the cur-
rent international law framework in terms of the threshold for military re-
sponse, attribution of conduct, and classification of the situation and per-
sonnel involved.77 Hezbollah’s engagement in hostilities in southern Leba-
non with Israeli armed forces in the summer of 2006 demonstrated the 
group’s ability to orchestrate State-like military operations in conjunction 
with decentralized cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned areas.78 
Russia’s alleged employment of covert operations to seize government 
buildings in Crimea in February 2014, undertaken by unidentified armed 
groups wearing unidentifiable uniforms, arguably left NATO practically 
helpless to respond.79 The concept of hybrid warfare also resonates in the 
Chinese concepts of “people’s war” and “unrestricted warfare” which ex-
tend the potential battlespace into the civilian and non-military realm.80 
These concepts provide the philosophical foundation for using fishing ves-
                                                                                                                      
tacks” in the National Defense Legal System and the Future Direction of its Debate], 32 BÔEIHÔ 
KENKYÛ [DEFENSE LAW REVIEW] 93, 96–97 (2008).     
76. See generally FRANK G. HOFFMAN, CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE RISE OF 
HYBRID WARS (2007); Sascha-Dominik Bachmann & Hakan Gunneriusson, Hybrid Wars: 
The 21st-Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security, 43 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF 
MILITARY STUDIES 77 (2014). 
77. Christopher J. Borgen, Law, Rhetoric, Strategy: Russia and Self-Determination Before and 
After Crimea, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 216, 268–71 (2015); Aurel Sari, Legal As-
pects of Hybrid Warfare, LAWFARE (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-
aspects-hybrid-warfare. 
78. HOFFMAN, supra note 76, at 35–42. 
79. Bachmann & Gunneriusson, supra note 76, at 87–89. 
80. See HOFFMAN, supra note 76, at 22–23. 
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sels as maritime militia to advance China’s strategic interest in territorial 
and maritime claims without the risk of open conflict.81     
While Japan’s security policy to address gray-zone situations can be 
viewed as recognition of its vulnerability to hybrid warfare, the additional 
authorization of the use of weapons to protect U.S. defense assets contrib-
uting to the defense of Japan does not directly address this issue. Alterna-
tively, the SDF can resort to the use of force under Article 88 of the SDF 
Law if the situation amounts to an armed attack because of its “scale and 
effect,”82 or because it poses an existential threat to Japan. However, offi-
cial recognition that an armed attack has occurred may well be politically 
unpalatable because of the concern of a hostile reaction by a State support-
ing, or sympathetic to, the militia in the absence of clear evidence to prove 
that a foreign State is exercising effective control over the militia’s activi-
ties.83 The strictures in the Japanese security legislation thus leave a gap be-
tween the two options (one providing for the use of too little force, the 
other too great a force) that may prevent the desired proportionate seam-
less response.  
 
B. Jus in Bello Issues 
 
Even in cases where the force used does not reach the required threshold 
of gravity for the exercise of the right of self-defense under international 
law, the situation may nonetheless constitute or evolve into an armed con-
flict where the law of armed conflict (LOAC) applies. For example, a non-
international armed conflict could arise with a militia for the purpose of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,84 due to the intensity of 
                                                                                                                      
81. James Kraska & Michael Monti, The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Mili-
tia, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 450, 451–57 (2015). 
82. Nicaragua, supra note 69, ¶ 195. 
83. For the evidentiary standard for attribution of conduct, see Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 
146 (Dec. 19); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 64, 71–72 (Nov. 
3); Nicaragua, supra note 69, ¶ 109. For analysis, see, James A. Green, Fluctuating Evidentiary 
Standards for Self-Defence in the International Court of Justice, 58 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARA-
TIVE LAW QUARTERLY 163 (2009). 
84. Convention for The Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC 
I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
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the conflict and the militia’s level of organization.85 In addition, if there is 
sufficient evidence that a foreign State’s support and assistance of a militia 
amounts to an “overall control” over their activities, the situation would 
then be classified as an international armed conflict.86 This is so even if the 
decentralized units are operating in the absence of clear evidence of a direct 
instruction or order from the foreign State that suggests the “effective con-
trol” required for attribution of the conduct to the State, and without 
which the State’s involvement cannot therefore constitute an armed attack, 
under jus ad bellum, against Japan.87 It means that the circumstances in 
which the SDF will be required to apply LOAC rules are not limited to the 
situations where the Defense against an Armed Attack Law applies, that is, 
in the event of an armed attack or an existential threat posed to Japan.   
Whether they are engaging in an international armed conflict or a non-
international armed conflict, the SDF is required to comply with the law of 
targeting under customary international law or under Additional Protocol I 
or II to the Geneva Conventions as applicable.88 Even in a maritime con-
text, an attack for the purposes of the application of LOAC rules means an 
act of violence, whether in offense or in defense,89 which may well be un-
                                                                                                                      
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
85. See generally SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 155–211 (2012); ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 115–58 
(2010). 
86. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 
404 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide]; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 100–101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecu-
tor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶137 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).  
87. In the context of the 2014 eastern Ukraine crisis, see, e.g., Patrycja Grzebyk, Clas-
sification of the Conflict between Ukraine and Russia in International Law (Ius ad Bellum and Ius in 
Bello), 34 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 51–56 (2014). 
88. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Japan acceded to Addi-
tional Protocols I and II on August 31, 2004. 
89. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 35(1); SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶ 13(b) (Louise Doswald-
Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]. 
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dertaken in order to protect a person or weapons and other equipment 
without necessarily causing death or injury. In other words, any act of vio-
lence employed by the SDF in an armed conflict situation must be inter-
preted in light of the applicable rules of LOAC. Thus, for example, a small 
fishing vessel engaging in hostile activities can only be targeted if it is, or 
may reasonably be assumed to be, a military objective where diversion or 
capture is not feasible and no other method is available for exercising mili-
tary control.90 As James Kraska and Michael Monti observe, however, 
when a large number of fishing vessels are involved, it is practically very 
challenging to distinguish vessels contributing in some way to the adver-
sary’s war efforts, from those engaged only in legitimate fishing, in imple-
menting LOAC obligations applicable at sea.91   
When the SDF has captured any foreign nationals—for example, 
members of militia on board the fishing vessels attempting an incursion 
into a disputed maritime zone—legal issues will arise regarding the treat-
ment of and legal protection accorded to those captured. If they are civil-
ians who took part in hostilities in a situation amounting to a non-
international armed conflict, they can be detained for trial according to Ja-
pan’s criminal law and procedure, as well as international human rights pro-
tection applicable in the country. On the other hand, if they are captured in 
an international armed conflict situation due to a foreign State’s “overall 
control” of the militia, or if there are uniformed members of a foreign mili-
tary force or government agents present among those captured, more care-
ful examination is required as to whether they are entitled to prisoner of 
war status.92 This may pose problems to the determination of their status 
under Japanese law as the application of the Law Concerning the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War is premised upon the existence of an armed at-
tack or an existential threat posed to Japan.93  
In gray-zone situations, the militia may deliberately sustain a low level 
of intensity in actual confrontation so as not to cross the intensity and or-
ganizational thresholds for a non-international armed conflict. State sup-
                                                                                                                      
90. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 89, ¶ 52. 
91. Kraska & Monti, supra note 81, at 465–66. The same practical challenge will con-
front the SDF even when they are acting under Article 88 of the SDF Law on the basis 
that the militia’s hostile activities, due to their large scale and effect, amount to an armed 
attack or an existential threat to Japan. 
92. GCIII, supra note 84, art. 4A. 
93. Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Personnel in the 
Event of an Armed Attack against Japan or an Existential Threat to Japan, Law No. 117 
of 2004 as amended by Law No. 76 of 2015, supra note 14, art. 2. 
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port may be clandestine so as not to provide sufficient evidence of “overall 
control” of the militia. On the other hand, as stated above, the application 
of LOAC obligations under the Japanese domestic law rests upon the ex-
istence of an “armed attack,” while under international law the existence of 
an armed conflict is a separate, factual question that does not depend on 
the legality of a State’s recourse to armed force. The Japanese Government 
may also be reluctant to recognize the hostile activities as an armed at-
tack—as the domestic legal basis for applying their LOAC obligations—or 
the existence of an international armed conflict, particularly when a foreign 
State is suspected of being involved, for political considerations, so as to 
avoid a full-scale armed confrontation with the foreign power. However, in 
cases where SDF members are captured by the adversary, the denial of an 
international armed conflict situation by the Japanese Government will in-
crease their risk of being subject to criminal prosecution without being 
granted the prisoner of war status owed them under international law.94   
Thus, there is a disjuncture in the current legal framework that attempts 
to regulate jus in bello issues such as targeting and the treatment of prisoners 
of war based on jus ad bellum criteria, creating a legal gap that can be effec-
tively exploited by hostile actors in gray-zone situations. It remains to be 
seen if the newly created category of “an existential threat to Japan” could 
be invoked to fill this legal gap through its substitution for the classification 
of an armed conflict in the absence of an armed attack directed against Ja-
pan, with a view to the application of the Defense Against an Armed At-
tack Law and the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The 
concept is, in its current form, restrictive in that it still requires an armed 
attack directed against a foreign State in a close relationship with Japan.  
 
IV.  THE USE OF FORCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
The 2015 security legislation extends the right of self-defense of SDF per-
sonnel to use weapons to defend members of another State’s forces sta-
tioned in the same compound as SDF personnel,95 and also in executing its 
mandates when engaged in international peace cooperation activities. More 
specifically, the SDF is authorized to use weapons to the extent reasonable 
under the prevailing situation when considered necessary for two purposes. 
The first of these is the protection of the lives and property of civilians 
                                                                                                                      
94. Mayama, supra note 12, at 23. 
95. PKO Law, supra note 19, as amended by Law No. 76 of 2015, supra note 14, art. 
25(7). 
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from harm and deterring threats to them, or the protection of a particular 
designated area (the civilian protection mandate).96 The second purpose is 
where the SDF comes to the aid of geographically distant units or person-
nel engaged in UN peacekeeping or other international peace and humani-
tarian operations when those units or personnel are in imminent risk of 
harm (the “come-to-the-aid” mandate).97 With respect to the latter man-
date, the legislation reportedly emphasizes protection of Japanese nationals 
engaging in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions,98 though it does not 
exclude aiding others. The authorization to use physical force under these 
mandates requires the SDF to be prepared to deal with the legal quagmire 
that has tormented UN peacekeepers engaged in the protection of civilians 
for many years, while acting within the constraints imposed by Japanese 
law and policy. 
 
A. The Legal Quagmire of Civilian Protection 
 
Japan’s decision to add the civilian protection and come-to-the-aid man-
dates to the tasks Japanese peacekeepers can perform is premised upon the 
understanding that “in recent years, such activities as maintenance of secu-
rity and protection of civilians have become increasingly important [in deal-
ing] with domestic conflicts and fragile states.”99 Indeed, the range of tasks 
conducted globally under peacekeeping mandates has expanded considera-
bly since the 1990s to include electoral assistance, disarmament, demobili-
zation and reintegration, security sector reform, rule of law activities and, 
most relevantly, protection of civilians.100 Yet, despite the UN’s increased 
experience in peacekeeping, problems have been encountered in develop-
ing and implementing some of these mandates. In particular, the use of 
                                                                                                                      
96. Id., arts. 3(5)(g), 26(1). 
97. Id., arts. 3(5)(v), 26(2). When implementing this mandate, SDF personnel shall not 
take actions that cause injury to or death of a person unless they are acting in self-defense 
or necessity under Articles 36 and 37 of the Criminal Code. Id., art. 26(3). 
98. Masahiro Kurosaki, “Kaketsuke-Keigo” no Houteki Wakugumi: Jieigainen no Tagensei to 
Houteki Kiban no Tasousei [The Legal Framework of “Come-to-an-Aid Protection”: The Pluralism in 
the Concept of Self-Defense and Multi-Layered Legal Grounds], 648 KOKUSAI MONDAI [INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS] 39, 42 (2015). 
99. ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, at 38. 
100. U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION & U.N. DEPARTMENT OF 
FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND 
GUIDELINES 20–30 (2008). 
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physical force by peacekeepers to protect civilians has been a vexing issue 
since its first inclusion in a peacekeeping mandate in 1999.101   
The mandate to protect civilians is typically crafted to specify the duties 
and responsibilities of the peacekeepers in providing protection for civil-
ians. The civilian protection mandate given to the UN Organization Stabi-
lization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 
for example, tasks it, inter alia, to: 
 
Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians un-
der threat of physical violence, including through active patrolling, paying 
particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, 
humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the context of vi-
olence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and miti-
gate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation.102 
 
To determine which civilians are under threat of physical violence or 
within the area of operations under this or a similar mandate, the peace-
keepers will be required to interpret the mandate with reference to the rele-
vant provisions of the UN Charter; if it is not a UN peacekeeping opera-
tion, reference would be made to the constitutional and other relevant in-
struments governing the authorizing body. In UN-authorized operations, a 
civilian protection mandate must be interpreted in accordance with the 
basic humanitarian and human rights norms set forth in Article 1(3) of the 
Charter.103 These basic norms arguably include the obligation to “ensure 
respect” for the rules of LOAC,104 as well as an obligation to take feasible 
                                                                                                                      
101. For the author’s previous work in this area, see Hitoshi Nasu, Peacekeeping, Civil-
ian Protection Mandates and the Responsibility to Protect, in NORMS OF PROTECTION: RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT, PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND THEIR INTERACTION 117, 119–21 
(Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski & Charles Sampford eds., 2012); Hitoshi Nasu, Opera-
tionalizing the Responsibility to Protect in the Context of Civilian Protection by UN Peacekeepers, 18 
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 364 (2011); Hitoshi Nasu, Operationalizing the “Responsi-
bility to Protect” and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, 14 
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 209 (2009). 
102. S.C. Res. 2147, ¶ 4(a)(i) (Mar. 28, 2014). 
103. See especially ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 198–215 (2004). 
104. See, e.g., GC I, supra note 84, art. 1. However, the scope of the obligation is con-
troversial. See, e.g., SIOBHAN WILLS, PROTECTING CIVILIANS 100–106 (2009); Carlo Fo-
carelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2010); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi 
Condorelli, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 
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precautions to protect the civilian population from the dangers resulting 
from military operations.105  
Even though the mandate may require peacekeepers to use physical 
force to protect civilians in the circumstances specified, their range of ac-
tion may be restricted by other provisions in the mandate and by other rel-
evant rules of international law.106 Political concerns about the danger of 
escalation, as well as uncertainty in interpreting the mandate and other ap-
plicable rules of international law, often discourage decision-makers from 
directing the use of physical force in carrying out the mandate.107 Typifying 
this reluctance, the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC, the predecessor 
of MONUSCO) was authorized to take “necessary measures” to fulfill its 
mandate “to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent 
threat of physical violence.”108 Notwithstanding this mandate, the force 
commander’s proposal to use physical force to deter the rebel forces’ ap-
proach to Bukavu in February 2004 was rejected by UN leadership due to 
the absence of backup support in the event of conflict escalation. That de-
cision allowed the rebel forces to take over the city without resistance.109  
A more rigorous implementation of the civilian protection mandate 
with the use of physical force, on the other hand, risks compromising the 
ability of peacekeepers to maintain a key operational principle of peace-
                                                                                                                      
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 67 (2000); Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking 
to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (1999).  
105. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 58; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 68–71 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
106. For discussion of potentially restrictive impacts of human rights obligations on 
the use of physical force, see, e.g., David S. Goddard, Applying the European Convention on 
Human Rights to the Use of Physical Force: Al-Saadoon, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 402  
(2015). 
107. For the author’s analysis of this issue, see HITOSHI NASU, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON PEACEKEEPING: A STUDY OF ARTICLE 40 OF THE UN CHARTER 185–88, 190–91 
(2009); Nasu, Operationalizing the “Responsibility to Protect” and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas of 
Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, supra note 101, at 230–38 (2009). 
108. S.C. Res. 1493, ¶ 25 (July 28, 2003). 
109. For details, see VICTORIA K. HOLT & TOBIAS C. BERKMAN, THE IMPOSSIBLE 
MANDATE? MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND MODERN 
PEACE OPERATIONS 172 (2007); Joshua Marks, The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian 
Protection in MONUC’s Peacekeeping Operations, 16 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW, no. 3,  2007, 
67, 74–75; Philip Roessler & John Prendergast, Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Case of 
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), in 
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PEACE OPERATIONS 229, 258 (William J. Durch ed., 2006). 
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keeping—impartiality.110 After the 2004 Bukavu crisis, the UN Security 
Council reinforced MONUC’s mandate with clearer language and addition-
al troops,111 which resulted in a range of more proactive operations to pro-
tect civilians from rebel attacks, while facilitating a disarmament, demobili-
zation and reintegration program that turned former rebels into members 
of the government armed forces. However, this offensive produced a back-
lash of increased hostile actions against UN personnel by rebel forces, in-
cluding the killing of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers.112 All these considera-
tions point to the difficulties that Japanese peacekeepers will encounter 
with regard to the use of physical force for the protection of civilians with-
in the framework of a peacekeeping operation. 
And there are other issues that will arise. Each national contingent con-
tributing to a peacekeeping operation is subject to other rules of interna-
tional law applicable to the contributing State. Under the Genocide Con-
vention,113 for example, the duty to act would arise when “the State was 
aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts 
of genocide would be committed.”114 Another issue is that of the extraterri-
torial application of human rights law. It remains to be seen how the issue 
will be dealt with by Japan—whether extraterritorial application will be de-
nied in all instances,115 applied to a limited extent to individuals who come 
within the full protection of the SDF contingent, or applied more broadly 
under the notion of “effective (overall) control” as expansively interpreted 
by the European Court of Human Rights.116 Depending on the position 
adopted, there may be further legal questions to be addressed, such as at-
tribution to Japan of any wrongful conduct committed by its forces and the 
concurrent application of LOAC and human rights law.  
 
                                                                                                                      
110. See Nasu, Peacekeeping, Civilian Protection Mandates and the Responsibility to Protect, su-
pra note 101, at 123–24. 
111. S.C. Res. 1565 (Oct. 1, 2004); S.C. Res. 1592 (Mar. 30, 2005). 
112. U.N. President of the Security Council, Statement of Mar. 2, 2005, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2005/10 (Feb. 17, 2006). 
113. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
114. Bosnian Genocide, supra note 86, ¶ 432. 
115. For an analysis of this position adopted by the United States, see Beth Van 
Schaack, The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obliga-
tions: Now is the Time for Change, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 20 (2014). 
116 See especially MARCO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 127–73 (2011). 
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B. Constraints under Japanese Law and Policy 
 
The intention behind the legislation providing for a more active contribu-
tion to international peacekeeping and other peace or humanitarian opera-
tions might have been that the SDF can avoid those difficulties by main-
taining the traditional five principles that guide the SDF’s participation in 
peacekeeping operations. They are (1) the existence of a ceasefire agree-
ment between the belligerent parties, (2) the host State’s consent, (3) im-
partiality, (4) withdrawal if any of the first three principles cease to be satis-
fied, and (5) minimum use of force. The last was modified by the new se-
curity legislation which allows the SDF to use weapons to the extent rea-
sonable under the prevailing situation to protect civilians and during come-
to-the-aid operations, but conditions it on continued host State consent to 
the peacekeeping operation and to the relevant tasks undertaken.117 How-
ever, these five guiding principles as revised are unlikely to avoid the diffi-
culties that have confronted peacekeepers in the past as it is often the rebel 
forces or rogue members of the government forces who engage in atroci-
ties against civilians even though a ceasefire agreement has been reached by 
their leadership.   
It is also important to note that, unlike the SDF’s support operations in 
grave circumstances affecting Japan or under the International Peace Sup-
port Law, SDF personnel can continue peacekeeping operations in areas 
where combat activities are taking place. This means that legislators as-
sumed SDF peacekeepers would be present in combat areas or even engage 
in combat activities to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. The 
SDF leadership must, therefore, have advance planning on how they might 
reconcile competing legal requirements in operational terms so as to enable 
their personnel to use physical force lawfully and effectively in implement-
ing their mandates in accordance with the Japanese government’s security 
policy, and then to communicate that to its forces through rules of en-
gagement.    
The concern of Japanese policymakers, however, seems to have been 
focused on the issue of the use of physical force by peacekeepers in rela-
tion to the principle of non-use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, because of Japan’s constitutional constraints. Illustrative is the fol-
lowing statement made in the 2014 Advisory Panel report: 
                                                                                                                      
117. PKO Law, supra note 19, as amended by Law No. 76 of 2015, supra note 14, art. 
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[T]he use of weapons by the SDF should be regarded as not constituting 
the use of force prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. . . .  U.N. 
PKOs are not activities that involve the “use of force” in international re-
lations as prohibited under the U.N. Charter for member states. U.N. 
PKOs are distinct from peace enforcement, which could entail large-scale 
military activities by so-called multi-national forces authorized by a U.N. 
resolution. Furthermore, “robust peacekeeping,” which involves certain 
enforcement force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, also does not 
fall [outside] of the category of a U.N. PKO in its nature, and is distinct 
from peace enforcement.118 
 
The reference to “robust peacekeeping” indicates that, in the Advisory 
Panel’s view, even the proactive use of physical force by SDF personnel 
engaged in a peacekeeping operation is not constitutionally prohibited. It 
does not necessarily mean that the authorization to use weapons under the 
civilian protection and come-to-the-aid mandates provided for in the new 
legislation is to be interpreted as authorizing the proactive use of physical 
force, nor does it reflect the actual security policy adopted by the Abe ad-
ministration. What it does suggests, however, is that the legislative devel-
opment concerning the deployment of the SDF for peacekeeping and oth-
er peace or humanitarian activities centered upon the constitutionality of 
the use of force by the SDF, almost to the exclusion of all the other issues 
that may arise in connection with the use of physical force to protect civil-
ians or humanitarian workers from attacks under relevant rules of interna-
tional law, as discussed above.    
 
V. THE USE OF FORCE IN COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
 
The most controversial aspect of the 2015 security legislation was the au-
thorization of actions in collective self-defense. This was accomplished by 
introducing the concept of an existential threat to Japan as the basis for 
expanding the scope in which force can legitimately be used within the am-
bit of Article 9. Although there is no explicit reference to it in the legisla-
tion itself, the debate in the Diet centered upon the right of collective self-
defense, consistent with the development of the idea by the Advisory Panel 
in its 2014 report: 
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In Japan, with regard to the right of collective self-defense, when a for-
eign country that is in a close relationship with Japan comes under an 
armed attack and if such a situation has the potential to significantly af-
fect the security of Japan, Japan should be able to participate in opera-
tions to repel such an attack by using force to the minimum extent neces-
sary, having obtained an explicit request or consent of the country under 
attack, and thus to make a contribution to the maintenance and restora-
tion of international peace and security even if Japan itself is not directly 
attacked.119 
  
The cabinet distanced itself from this approach in its July 1, 2014 decision 
by emphasizing that the reinterpretation of Article 9 was based on the 
threat to Japan’s own survival posed by an armed attack against a State in a 
close relationship with Japan, rather than grounding the legal justification 
on the right of collective self-defense.120  
The Abe administration’s emphasis on Japan’s own survival resulting 
from an attack on another State considerably diminished the explanatory 
power of the distinction between individual and collective self-defense. 
This invited the opposition parties to question the need to rely upon the 
right of collective self-defense as the legal basis for the expanded scope of 
SDF deployments envisaged under the administration’s security policy. 
Prime Minister Abe responded by explaining the difference between indi-
vidual and collective self-defense in the context of minesweeping opera-
tions: 
 
Certainly, if the sea surrounding Japan was mined for the purpose of at-
tacking Japan, in that case we can exercise the right of individual self-
defense. In my view, however, if the Strait of Hormuz was mined, our 
vessels could be hit but there is an issue of vessel nationality, many of our 
vessels are registered in a foreign state, and also foreign-flagged vessels 
can be targeted; clearing the mines laid is ostensibly considered as an exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense under international law and therefore we consider 
that as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense; however, it will 
be an extremely limited and receptive operation in my view.121 
  
                                                                                                                      
119. Id. at 29–30. 
120. Cabinet Decision, supra note 3, § 3(4). 
121. 189th Diet Sess., House of Representatives Budget Committee Official Record 
of Proceedings No. 13, at 9–10 (Mar. 3, 2015) (emphasis added). 
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It is unclear on what ground and in what context minesweeping is “os-
tensibly considered” as an exercise of the right of collective, as opposed to 
individual, self-defense. Blocking the passage of vessels through the Strait 
of Hormuz would interfere with the right of transit passage under the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention or, alternatively, the right of non-suspendable 
innocent passage under the 1958 Geneva Convention.122 This remains the 
case even when the coastal State is engaged in an international armed con-
flict,123 though in that instance the passage can arguably be restricted.124 If 
the strait were mined to block the passage of vessels, it would also consti-
tute the use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,125 and 
may potentially amount to an armed attack against the States—including 
Japan—whose vessels use the strait.126 Japan may choose to participate in 
minesweeping as the exercise of the right of individual self-defense “collec-
tively” in cooperation with other States; however, that is to be distin-
guished from the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Therefore, 
the rationale for invoking the right of collective self-defense in this scenario 
is not persuasively established. 
Although minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz is the only exceptional 
scenario currently envisaged for SDF deployment,127 the Abe administra-
tion’s recognition of collective self-defense as legitimate under Article 9 of 
                                                                                                                      
122. LOS Convention, supra note 74, art. 38; Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone art. 16(4), Apr. 19, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. For the 
U.S. view on the passage regime in the Strait of Hormuz, see James Kraska, Legal Vortex in 
the Strait of Hormuz, 54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (2014). 
123. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 89, r. 26. 
124. See, e.g., James Farrant, Modern Maritime Neutrality Law, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 198, 219–20 (2014); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Naval Warfare and 
International Straits, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 263, 
265–67 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, U.S Naval War Col-
lege International Law Studies); Dietrich Schindler, 1907 Hague Convention XIII Concerning 
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War: Commentary, in THE LAW OF NAVAL 
WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 
193, 220 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988).   
125. Nilufer Oral, Transit Passage Rights in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block 
the Passage of Oil Tankers, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 3, 2012), https://www.asil.org/insights 
/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threa 
ts-block-passage#_edn16. 
126. Oil Platforms, supra note 83, ¶ 72 (“The Court does not exclude the possibility that 
the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the ‘inherent 
right of self-defence.’”). 
127. 189th Diet Sess. House of Representatives Security Bills Special Committee Of-
ficial Record of Proceedings No. 6, at 35 (June 1, 2015). 
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the Constitution will have significant implications for Japan’s national de-
fense and its efforts to contribute to international peace and security. This 
is particularly so when the right of collective self-defense is considered as 
the justification for involvement in combined security operations in anoth-
er country, even where participation does not involve physical deployment 
of SDF troops, this latter scenario being the eventuality envisaged by the 
general public—even feared by some—in Japan. For example, Japan may 
contribute advanced facial recognition software, high-resolution satellite 
images and intelligence information, all critical to the identification of sus-
pected terrorists, to a multinational military operation engaging in the tar-
geted killings of suspected terrorists in another country. None of these 
contributions requires the SDF to employ physical force, but could, never-
theless, be considered as aiding or assisting in the use of force amounting 
to the commission of an internationally wrongful act.128 While other States 
may justify their actions as an exercise of the right of collective self-
defense, unless Japan were to do likewise, it could be held responsible for 
an internationally wrongful act on the grounds that, in providing assistance, 
Japan knowingly contributed significant support to the States engaged in 
the operation.129  
The full potential of the new security legislation cannot be harnessed to 
achieve the desired “seamless response” to the variety of security threats 
Japan may face without more directly addressing the issue of what consti-
tutes the use of force for the purposes of Article 9. The twisted under-
standing of the term that has traditionally been adopted to circumvent the 
constitutional issues—namely, that the term and accompanying Article 9 
restrictions are limited to the use of weapons in combat zones, while sup-
port activities are excluded—continues to underlie the structural founda-
tion of Japan’s security-related laws. This is reflected in the two new con-
cepts introduced by the 2015 legislation: (1) the use of force in response to 
an existential threat to Japan and (2) the provision of support where there 
                                                                                                                      
128. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 16, 
Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 
2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
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129. See Ilias Plakokefalos, Causation in the Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of 
Overdetermination: In Search of Clarity, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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are grave circumstances affecting Japan, with the former being subject to 
the Article 9 restrictions, while the latter is not. 
The conceptual misalignment has meant that the Article 9 analysis has 
focused exclusively on whether the operation in question would involve the 
use of weapons and combat operations, or be limited to logistical support. 
If the former, it would be prohibited except for national self-defense, but, 
if the latter, it would be permitted on the grounds that logistical support 
does not constitute an integral part of combat operations. This has led to 
the general domestic acceptance of the legal position that the SDF’s partic-
ipation in international military operations is permitted, as long as their ac-
tivities do not involve the use of weapons in combat. However, this misses 
the point that, under international law, even the provision of logistical sup-
port may engage Japan’s responsibility, and thus operations to which Japan 
provides logistical support must be underpinned by just as sound a legal 
basis as those operations in which Japan engages in combat.130 Failure to 
grasp this point may leave Japan vulnerable to potential legal liability when 
it contributes logistical support to multinational military operations without 
the same scrutiny that would be applied to the legal basis if physical force 
were to be used by the SDF.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution—the “war renunciation clause”—
has meant Japan has had to develop a legal architecture that enables the 
SDF to use armed force within constitutional and political constraints. The 
result is a legal regime that has developed as a patchwork of technical 
amendments and special legislation that distorts the understanding of what 
constitutes the “use of force” for purposes of constitutional interpretation, 
and imposes unnecessarily restrictive limitations (and, in some instances, 
prohibitions) on the SDF’s participation in peacekeeping and other multi-
national security operations. The new security legislation mends some of 
the unraveled seams left by previous legislation, and enhances Japan’s na-
tional security by permitting the SDF to make a greater contribution to 
combined security operations with the United States, as well as increasing 
the ability to effectively participate in multinational operations. As ex-
plained in this article, however, there still remains a disjuncture between the 
                                                                                                                      
130. For the author’s analysis of this issue, see Nasu, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitu-
tion, supra note 10, at 62–64. 
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new legislative regime and relevant rules of international law, leaving gaps 
and uncertainties that can be exploited by hostile actors.  
First, the legislative framework for the SDF’s military and policing ac-
tion is structured according to the jus ad bellum criteria. This exposes Japan’s 
vulnerability to effective, well-coordinated hybrid warfare that does not 
cross the gravity threshold required to constitute an armed attack, thus lim-
iting the response only to law enforcement measures. This also means that 
the legislative regime is not well equipped to deal with jus in bello issues, 
such as targeting and the treatment of captives in an international or non-
international armed conflict, when the hostile conduct does not reach the 
gravity threshold necessary to be an armed attack. However, creative use of 
new concepts such as “an existential threat to Japan” could prove to be 
useful in circumventing these legal gaps by allowing the SDF to apply the 
relevant rules of international law more flexibly. 
Second, while it is encouraging that the civilian protection and the 
come-to-the-aid mandates have been added to the peacekeeping missions 
in which the SDF can participate, past and current operations illustrate the 
complexity of the issues that may arise. This is particularly so with respect 
to the scope of legal obligations to defend civilians and other personnel 
with the use of physical force under the authorizing mandate or other rele-
vant rules of international law. Notwithstanding the recent revision to the 
five principles guiding the SDF’s participation in peacekeeping operations, 
the SDF will still be challenged in reconciling competing legal requirements 
within the framework of the government’s security policy.  
Third, even though the policy rationale for reinterpreting Article 9 to al-
low Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense was not convincing-
ly presented and, in any event, too narrowly framed, the new official inter-
pretation will have significant implications for Japan’s efforts to achieve a 
truly seamless response to security threats. By more fully appreciating the 
role an exercise of the right of collective self-defense can play, Japan can 
take advantage of an essential legal defense to potential claims of State re-
sponsibility for aiding or assisting the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act when it engages in a multinational security operation, even in a 
situation that involves no employment of physical force by the SDF. How-
ever, Japan will not be able to harness the full potential of the reinterpreta-
tion of Article 9 until it addresses the conceptual misalignment inherent in 
Japan’s traditional understanding that restrictions under Article 9 of the 
Constitution uniformly apply to any use of physical force in combat situa-
tions. 
